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Philosophy is often caricatured as one of the most disconnected and anemic academic enterprises. Yet in philosophers’ own ac-
counts of what drew them to the problems they 
have sought to address they answer, typically, in 
two broad, passionate, ways: wonder or anxiety. 
As such, philosophy, and philosophers’ self-under-
standing of themselves and their enterprise, can 
serve as a way to address some of the important 
topics raised by Rosfort and Stanghellini. Even for 
philosophers, the emotional experience of moods 
and affects is employed in narrativity, or at least, 
employed when one is called to give an account of 
oneself. One could envisage a party conversation 
along these lines:
So why did you become a philosopher?
Well, I wanted to go to university but wasn’t inter-
ested in science or in the humanities and I’ve always 
been dreadful at languages.
(Laugh) But you must like something about it as you 
wouldn’t have become a professor?
You know how it is . . . you drift into things. I did 
well as an undergraduate, my tutor suggested I should 
do a PhD. Found an excellent supervisor, and got a few 
papers published and then a teaching post. . . .
You must be very committed to the subject.
Ummm—I guess so. I thought about joining the civil 
service after my PhD, but always managed to find work 
and the hours are much more flexible at universities!
Well I think it is amazing: to think and teach about 
such important things.
Do you?
There is something slightly baffling here that may 
simply be part of the inherent irony and self-
deprecation of some academics. The philosopher’s 
interlocutor is asking about what philosophy 
means to the philosopher: why he has given his 
life to it. As such, she is alluding to a deeper, philo-
sophical question that, after decades of falling out 
of favor, is returning to the attention of philoso-
phers: namely, how has philosophy given your life 
meaning? The philosopher responds with possible 
irony, banality, or superficiality and invokes luck 
rather than meaning in his narrative. He serves 
as Nietzsche’s feared nihilist. The account offered 
also seems to fail to meet normative standards, 
and depending on how the philosopher carries it 
off, this gap between expectation and reality in 
the conversation may generate humor.
However, the greater likelihood is that the 
conversation engenders perplexity and disappoint-
ment in the interviewer. Rather like the characters 
in Evelyn Waugh’s early novels, the philosopher 
is buffeted passively by life and luck and eschews 
agency or meaning. In Waugh’s skilled hands this 
becomes tragic comedy; for the philosopher and 
his interlocutor we have disconnection and sad-
ness. The crucial reason for this is that we need 
to use terms referring to moods, affects, meaning, 
and emotion when we offer an account of our-
selves and when we try to understand ourselves. 
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Otherwise, something is missing and the reason 
a person gives for their actions either look like 
poor reasons or not reasons at all (Bortolotti and 
Broome 2008). Further, agency, rationality, and 
self-knowledge may themselves be dependent upon 
reason-giving.
In invoking moods and affects in one’s narra-
tive the practical understanding (or ‘affordances’) 
of the world one inhabits are laid open in clear 
view. Hence Aristotle’s account of wonder as the 
stimulus for philosophy. Aristotle says: ‘For it is 
owing to their wonder that men both now begin 
and at first began to philosophize; they wondered 
originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced 
little by little and stated difficulties about the 
greater matters’ (1984, 1554). Conversely, given 
the experience of transcendence, of ambiguity, of 
finitude rather than wondrous awe, the philoso-
pher may be motivated by anxiety (Kant’s awak-
ening from his dogmatic slumbers, Heidegger’s 
battles with ‘Crisis’ and the flight of the gods). 
Either manner of accounting for one’s interest 
seems to work normatively in the giving of reasons 
and in generating a narrative, and, moreover, a 
philosophical narrative.
Our fictional dialogue and discussion aims to 
reinforce the important link between narrative, 
reason-giving and moods and affects argued for 
by Rosfort and Stanghellini. To make our ac-
counts carry weight, we need to invoke feelings, 
affects, moods, meaning, and purpose. However, 
we would seek to extend this point. In their clear 
taxonomy of mental states, they suggest that emo-
tions are “characterized by their connection to 
motivation and movement” (authors’ italics, 2009, 
256) and that the “feeling dimension of emotion 
is what permits [us] to distinguish emotion among 
other cognitive functions (perception, deliberation, 
evaluation, judging etc.)” (p. 256). This latter 
quote is somewhat grammatically opaque but the 
idea seems to be that ‘feeling’ allows us, given the 
discriminatory function Rosfort and Stanghellini 
attribute to it, to pick out emotional states from 
other nonfeeling, nonemotional, cognitive func-
tions.
Rosfort and Stanghellini’s account is Heideg-
gerian in several ways. Their view of the person 
as ‘being in the world,’ their sophisticated under-
standing of attunement as constitutive to identity 
and action and the overall view of Dasein’s (the 
human being) existence as care, are at the heart 
of their view. On Heidegger’s account in Being 
and Time, the minimal unit of meaning is ‘being 
in the world’ (in-der-Welt-sein). This unit is not 
dissimilar to Damasio’s. The minimal, or core, self 
is the embodied (if underdeveloped) self Heidegger 
describes as always already in a world, always 
already embodied. The autobiographical self is 
the temporal self, or the Heideggerian ‘thrown-
projection.’
For Heidegger, describing human existence as 
‘thrown’ signals our embedded and contextual 
existence. A person is always thrown into a world, 
a habitus, an environment. There is an element of 
givenness to us, captured by the thought that we 
each have a past that is at least temporally given, 
fixed. We also project ourselves into a future—into 
projects, plans, and hopes that direct our current 
behavior and put it in a meaningful relation to the 
future. This relationship of our present to our past 
and our future constitutes the temporal dimension 
of human existence, or what Damasio calls the 
autobiographical self.
The connection Rosfort and Stanghellini make 
to narrative toward the end of the paper is impor-
tant. Viewing narrativity in relation to temporality 
and self-reflection provides a full picture of the 
person as existing in time. It also grounds the 
ability for therapeutic change in this particular 
picture of the person. We can modify our relation-
ship to our past (through psychotherapy, religious 
conversion, and so on) and it is this capacity for 
modification, for retelling, that is significant to 
Rosfort and Stanghellini’s emphasis on narrativ-
ity. Such a modification, in turn, affects the way 
in which we view, and act toward, the future. 
So modifying the ways in which we understand 
ourselves may change both our relationship to the 
past and to the future.
It is important to note here that by ‘understand-
ing’ (Verstehen) Heidegger does not mean reflec-
tive or passive cognitive understanding. Rather, his 
term is loaded with active and pragmatic meaning, 
as well as with affective force. We understand 
ourselves through and in our actions, choices, and 
forms of engagement with the world and with our-
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selves. We are not neutral about our life story and 
events; we have preferences and these preferences 
are expressed in the emotional response we have 
toward future scenarios. Compare your emotional 
response to being invited to eat ice cream in the 
sun to the one evoked by being thrown into a dark 
dungeon. One way in which we can reflect and 
assess future plans and projects is by tuning in to 
our affective responses to them.
This pragmatic and emotive view of one’s self-
understanding and reflexive evaluation as action-
based and emotionally colored brings together the 
core and autobiographical selves. It demonstrates 
the centrality of emotion to all aspects of human 
perception and reflection, including the cognitive 
and rational spheres.
The pragmatic view of ‘understanding’ points 
us to a missing aspect of Heidegger’s attempt to 
provide a comprehensive account of the self. This 
is the embodied dimension of existence he only 
gestures toward in isolated comments in Being 
and Time. To bring together the core and auto-
biographical selves, we need a unified account of 
human mind and body, such as the one provided 
by Merleau-Ponty. If our self-understanding is 
pragmatic and grounded in concrete actions and 
attitudes, it must also be embodied and intimately 
linked to our physical capacities and actions. As 
Rosfort and Stanghellini write, “This view is aimed 
at putting person, body, and world together again” 
(p. 255). This suggested reconciliation also applies 
to the realm of emotions, where the authors sug-
gest synthesizing ‘feeling theories’ and ‘cognitive 
theories,’ as emotions are rooted in both physi-
ological reactions and psychological phenomena 
(p. 256).
However, can we think about a cognitive state 
that is worthy of its name, that would not be con-
nected to motivation and movement? We should 
not rely on an assumption of transparency of 
one’s mental states to oneself to delineate whether 
‘feeling is present,’ but rather keep Rosfort and 
Stanghellini’s helpful, almost behavioristic, defi-
nition in mind: for us to notice anything, to take 
up an attitude or stance toward anything in the 
world or in our own consciousness, requires it 
to be salient and for us to care about it. As with 
Davidson’s assault on scheme–content dualism, 
it seems rather incoherent to think that we are 
presented with some neutral “given,” which we 
then subsequently appraise or conceptualize in an 
emotional manner.
Instead, one could learn from McDowell and 
reject the dualism between recognition and emo-
tional response, without rejecting the duality. For 
us to notice anything, to entertain any conscious 
representations, requires meaning and value to be 
present, and for us to take up a stance toward it. 
Recognition implies an affective response: if we 
did not care, we would not notice (Bortolotti and 
Broome 2007). Hence, we would suggest that all 
mental states we are aware of and those that are 
connected with action have to be affective in some 
form or another. To consider the alternative brings 
the idea of a dispassionate, impotent, unconnected, 
and passive agent and with it the dangers of solip-
sism, Cartesianism, and what McDowell (1994) 
refers to as ‘frictionless spinning in the void.’ A 
mind internally coherent, but with no intentional-
ity toward the world.
Rosfort and Stanghellini make good sense in 
their discussion of how moods and affects can 
arise from one another. Clinically, the clearest 
example may be that of the patient with posttrau-
matic stress disorder after a severe, life-threatening 
trauma: this would result in a pronounced affect, 
and an entirely different world subsequently being 
inhabited due to an altered mood state. We refer to 
this as ‘hypervigilance,’ but that term barely cap-
tures the profound existential changes. The world 
is now a place with an absence of safe havens, 
everyone is a potential threat: there is no rest.
Putting psychopathology to one side, and con-
sidering the role affects and moods play in our own 
self-understanding and understanding of others, 
one can see how the self is directly constituted by 
the stories we tell around our affective connections 
to the world. Some affects are received passively 
to some extent: our friend dies, we get attacked, 
and although we can choose and have some degree 
of freedom as to how we interpret and appraise 
these events, they may lead to more long-standing 
changes in mood. Conversely, we can choose to 
generate strong affects in ourselves. Rather like 
Aristotle’s teaching regarding the acquisition of 
virtue, can we seek out affective states with a view 
to altering our mood and personhood?
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In contrast with the sufferer of posttraumatic 
stress disorder, would the ‘adrenaline junkie’ in-
habit a different world of different affordances? By 
exposure to threatening, but positively appraised, 
events that lead to profound affects would there be 
a resultant change in mood, attunement, and mode 
of care toward the world? Would the dominant 
mode of affordance be that of a challenge, of a 
cause of excitement? Some of these techniques of 
exposing an individual to certain affective states 
that they may not seek out voluntarily could 
be viewed as one of the mechanisms utilized in 
psychotherapy, whether psychodynamic (transfer-
ence) or cognitive–behavioral (‘behavioral experi-
ments’). Pronounced affects are manipulated in a 
safe environment by the therapist with the hope 
that longstanding changes in mood are engendered 
and a different world of affordances is attained.
Finally, it is the questioning nature of the person 
brought out by Rosfort and Stanghellini that is 
central to philosophy. They describe the person 
as ‘position-taking’ and ‘questioning being.’ And 
it is the evaluative stance and its reflexive mode 
that are core to philosophy’s understanding of 
the self and of itself. This account moves beyond 
Damasio’s ‘evolutionary conglomerate’ and adds a 
philosophical dimension to human existence itself, 
not only to its description. On this view, the trait 
that picks out human existence from other kinds 
of biological existence is the ability to self-reflect, 
to evaluate and position oneself in relation to both 
a physical and a social environment. And it is this 
evaluative dimension that Rosfort and Stanghellini 
see as not only cognitive but also emotive.
Heidegger’s account of Dasein, the human be-
ing as the creature whose existence (and therefore 
nonexistence) is an issue for it, resonates with 
Rosfort and Stanghellini’s account. As Heidegger 
writes: “That Being which is an issue for this entity 
in its very Being, is in each case mine. Thus Dasein 
is never to be taken ontologically as an instance 
or special case of some genus of entities as things 
that are present-at-hand. To entities such as these, 
their Being is ‘a matter of indifference’; or more 
precisely, they ‘are’ such that their Being can be 
neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the 
opposite” (Heidegger 1927/1962, 67–68).
Additionally, and importantly for Rosfort and 
Stanghellini, Heidegger views this questioning 
activity as intimately linked to different kinds 
of moods. Some moods are more disclosive than 
others. Some moods, notably anxiety, reveal to 
us the world as a whole. Heidegger’s taxonomy 
of Stimmungen ‘moods’ and Befindlichkeit ‘states 
of mind’ (or affectivity, to use Hubert Dreyfus’ 
translation), is in agreement with Rosfort and 
Stanghellini’s emphasis on moods as character 
building and essential to moral and self-evaluation. 
Moods play an important interpretative role in 
helping us situate ourselves in relation to a specific 
context or situation, in relation to the world as a 
whole, and also in relation to ourselves. As Heide-
gger writes in Kant and the Problem of Metaphys-
ics, “with every mood wherein ‘something is this 
way or that’, our Dasein becomes manifest to us” 
(1973/1990, 155).
Moods are also related to our thrownness and 
sociality. In the same way that we ‘find ourselves’ 
in a particular world, society, and context, we 
also ‘find ourselves’ in a mood. Our mood is also 
the background of our communication with oth-
ers and our social world. And most important 
for our discussion here, moods also ground our 
understanding—our self-interpretation and self-
understanding of ourselves as being in a particular 
world (Carel 2006).
Moods are not epiphenomenal to our uncover-
ing of the world; they are rather constitutive of 
this uncovering. They reveal the world, disclose 
our thrownness into it and enable us to respond 
to it. Moods are also the core of our openness to 
the world. They show us the world as something 
that can affect us. Different moods are different 
ways to realize our relationship to the world. 
In this sense they are not subjective or internal. 
Rather, they reflect a relation between us and our 
world (Carel 2006).
It is ultimately the significant role moods play as 
reflexive evaluators that ties together the sophisti-
cated cognitive functions of the autobiographical 
self to the visceral and prereflective core self. They 
also overcome the gulf between ‘feeling theories’ 
and ‘cognitive theories’ of emotion. By viewing 
moods as contributing to the person’s continu-
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ously updated reflective equilibrium we can see 
moods as playing a crucial role in the construction 
of personhood and as tying together mind and 
body which were artificially split by Cartersian 
dualist tradition. As Rosfort and Stanghellini 
write: “[moods] awake questions, doubts, con-
siderations, evaluations, and finally deliberations 
about my-being-this-person” (p. 260).
So counter to the common understanding (and 
self-understanding) of philosophy as rational, 
cerebral, and based on reason and argument, 
Rosfort and Stanghellini’s paper opens the way for 
us to see philosophy as requiring mood, contain-
ing a sometimes implicit emotional tonality and 
coloring and as being a form of attunement to the 
world, in both senses of the word: attunement as 
a form of listening or tuning in and attunement 
as affect, as a mood through which we are able to 
perceive the world at all. To return to our listless 
philosopher: he was not devoid of affect regarding 
his chosen profession, but displaying boredom or 
presenting himself in a restrained way. And these 
are not lack of mood, but a particular affectivity 
that discloses something about his particular vi-
sion of philosophy.
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